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Abstract  
 
Admittedly, the balance of power within the European institutions, especially 
those related to financial stability and economic policy, is controlled by Germany. 
The German Federal Republic as the "main creditor" controls the Eurogroup, the 
Euro Working Group and has privileged relations with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Due to this fact, Wolfgang 
Schäuble as the exponent of the hard German economic strategy has a leading 
role within the European decision-making institutions. France, Italy and other 
countries are unsuccessfully trying to counteract and mitigate the German 
influence, as shown by the Greek issue. 
 
This framework is tightly connected with the negotiating ability of any country 
that inconsistently attempts to reverse the status quo, modify the rules or change 
the terms of an agreement. The Greek government of Alexis Tsipras sufficiently 
experienced this suffocating experience and announced a referendum as an 
attempt to open the field of negotiations. 
 
 
1. The balance of power and the referendum   
 
Admittedly, the balance of power within the European institutions, especially 
those related to financial stability and economic policy, is controlled by Germany. 
The German Federal Republic as the "main creditor" controls the Eurogroup, the 
Euro Working Group and has privileged relations with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Due to this fact, Wolfgang 
Schäuble as the exponent of the hard German economic strategy has a leading 
role within the European decision-making institutions ( Mavrozaharakis: 2015 a) . 
France, Italy and other countries are unsuccessfully trying to counteract and 
mitigate the German influence, as shown by the Greek issue. 
 
This framework is tightly connected with the negotiating ability of any country 
that inconsistently attempts to reverse the status quo, modify the rules or change 
the terms of an agreement. The Greek government of Alexis Tsipras sufficiently 
experienced this suffocating experience and announced a referendum as an 
attempt to open the field of negotiations. 
 
However, the effectiveness of this choice is characterized by great uncertainty, 
considering the messages arrived from all over the world and most importantly, 
from Germany. In this case, Schäuble – whose statements are usually a reliable 
orientation for the European institutions - explicitly and squarely noted that 
negotiations after the referendum – independently from its result - will start from 
the beginning and will include much tougher conditions. 
 
After the announcement of the referendum, allies and opponents of Greece 
interpreted incorrectly that the affirmative answer "yes" declares a desire to 
remain in the euro and the negative answer "no", the desire to exit the Eurozone. 
Despite the fact that the real question was misleading, because it asked for 
confirmation of an agreement which included tough austerity measures, there 
was almost no one in Europe to interpret the referendum with a denial against 
austerity and not a denial against Europe. If a similar question was set to any 
European country, citizens’ response would also have been negative, with even 
much higher percentages and participation in several countries.  
 
Undeniably, it is not expected that any European citizen would have answered 
“yes” to such a question which directly asks if he wants the already reduced 
salaries, social expenditure and pensions to be cut even more and to be taxed 
even more. However, the Greek government has underestimated the negative 
reaction and interpretation of the Eurozone partners who, from their own part, 
are subject to their insufficiently informed public about what is happening in 
Greece. Besides, the Greek government is called to negotiate with these partners 
independently from the referendum’s result. In this context the Greek side must 
now correctly interpret both the question and the answer of the referendum. 
Additionally, we should not forget that the government had a fresh mandate from 
the people to negotiate with partners and even to refuse any proposed 
agreement. However, the government preferred to defalcate a populist and 
irredentist "no" by the public which now threatens to become a boomerang.  
 
2. The populist background 
 
The background of this problematic political stance is a specific form of populism 
(Mavrozacharakis/ Tzagarakis/ Kamekis : 2015,s. 2-5)  in Greece , that refers  on a 
form of primitivism (a weakened form of nationalism), autarchy and popular 
sovereignty. Right wing populists often invoke the overthrow of popular 
sovereignty in order to accentuate the catalytic effect of migration while at the 
same concept, leftist populists emphasize on the dissolution of the national state 
because of the memorandum (imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Central Bank and the European Commission). (Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, 
C. R. :2012). It is obvious that the factors that favor the emergence of populists in 
Greece have found fertile ground during the last four years due to the economic 
downturn. 
Economic disparities that continually expand the decadent political system and 
frustration for the traditional political forces about their ability to implement 
effective policies that will offer real solutions to the problems plaguing the middle 
and lower social groups, cause the rise of populism and political extremism 
(Mavrozacharakis: 2015 b , S 39-44). )  
Greece in the last Decade is an classical case of the so-called “political malaise”, 
that finds an obviously articulation in an rapid decline in party membership, an 
massive distrust of people against politics , politicians and public institutions , in 
an increasing number of de-aligned and disillusioned voters open to radical left or 
right political options that expresses an social messianism for everyone, the 
existence of Leaders willing to exploit existing socio-economical situation to his 
advantage and in an media landscape that presents facts and opinions in an way 
that creates even more anti-political atmosphere and contribute to popularization 
of populism parties(Mavrozacharakis/ Tzagarakis/ Kamekis :  2015), . 
But first of all Greece is an problematic case of policy adjustment that has to do 
with the party colonization and state domination of interest politics, like stated by 
Lanza and Lavdas ( 2000)   
 
 
2. The search for “new” legitimacy   
 
In any case, the Greek political leadership has chosen  the path of the referendum 
in an  to recover its diminishing legitimacy, in an extreme Expression of populism 
that ignores the crucial situation of the country and the related dangers.  With this 
paradox  form of action the left-right government in Greece purposes  to refresh 
the  ties between power and the people.                            
Now the government has renewed its legitimization and has untied hands in order 
to bring a better deal. Apart from the fact that the referendum was not 
conducted in the appropriate time and with an inappropriate question, Greek 
people showed a remarkable soberness. Those who voted for “no” have chosen 
something completely logical based on the question structure. It was impossible 
for the majority of the Greek people to put its own explicit signature to the 
implementation of measures which include further cuts and more austerity. You 
cannot ask an entire population if he wants to hang him! Additionally, those who 
voted for “yes” acted logically as the inappropriate question of the referendum 
was internationally translated as "yes or no to the euro." In other words people 
who have voted for “yes” expressed their willingness to suffer further sacrifices 
in order for the country to remain in the European core. Several voted "yes" 
considering that the next proposal of the institutions will be even tougher. In 
conclusion, there is a complete consensus on the public to remain in the European 
core with reasonable self-sacrifices. Therefore, the referendum did not set a real 
dilemma. 
 
Partly, those who voted for "yes" seem to have made a reasonable choice. 
Currently, Tsipras brings Juncker proposal with some variations into new 
negotiations as a basis for a new agreement. Despite the vindication of "yes", the 
extreme rhetoric by devotees of "no" in everyday life was so great that “yes” 
supporters had chosen to express themselves silently and quietly. However, there 
is no certainty that the roles would not be reversed after the referendum. It is 
obvious that in the Greek society there is now one implicit (latent) division. 
 
On the other hand, those who voted for "no" can also feel vindicated because 
they supported the request for a change of the implemented austerity policies. 
However, was it logical to reach the limits of a national division in order to find 
alternatives to the implemented policies?  
 
3 The ESM and new strict conditions  
 
However, it is obvious that the German finance minister as well as many EU 
officials, indicate that the new agreement will be subject to terms and rules of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which is part of the fiscal treaty. It is also 
expectable that additional time will be required for further evaluation of the 
Greek economic situation which has worsened drastically after the closure of the 
banks. According to the ESM regulations, the new agreement may not necessarily 
include the IMF but Germany insists on its indefinitely participation. Moreover, the 
Treaty of the ESM expressly dictates the agreement under the term of a 
Memorandum in order to allow a new loan. 
As specified in the ESM regulation, the conditions associated with a loan should 
contain "detailed fiscal consolidation measures and policies that should be 
promoted for their implementation." 
 
Referring to Article 12 of the ESM Treaty which was ratified by the Greek 
Parliament in March 2012 and listed in the National Law by Law no. 4063 / 2012, it 
is clear that the ESM provide loans to its members "under strict conditions, 
suitable for the selected financial assistance facility". In Article 14 of the ESM 
Treaty it is specified that the assistance is provided as a precautionary credit line 
conditional (Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line - PCCL) or in the form of a 
credit line with reinforced conditions (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line - ECCL). In 
Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, it is mentioned that the estimations for a possible 
loan to a Member State are entrusted to the European Commission in 
cooperation with the ECB. The procedure is as follows: the preservation of 
financial stability and debt sustainability as well as the required financing needs of 
the Member State is being under evaluation by the ESM along with the IMF 
assistance. Hereafter, the European Commission takes charge in cooperation with 
the ECB and the IMF in order to negotiate a memorandum of understanding with 
the Member State with detailed terms and prerequisites. Subsequently, the 
Member State is required to implement the agreed structural and fiscal measures 
 
The hard part in the whole process is the rigorous supervision to the Member 
State. Actually, the Member State is required to provide accountability to the ESM 
on a monthly basis by transferring all necessary information required for the 
performance of lending activity and risk management as well as monthly 
information on the details of government's cash balances and detailed 
information about financial system development. The European Commission and 
the ECB, possibly together with the IMF, are responsible for monitoring the 
program and its compliance. This framework also includes the conduction of 
several inspection missions by the ESM to the Member State in order to verify the 
progress and evaluate the implementation of the agreed measures. 
 
In other words, the Brussels Group will not exist anymore and Troika will be again 
institutionally legitimized. Every three months the Troika will disclose its findings 
to the ESM's Board of Directors which will decide whether further measures are 
needed. 
If a borrower Member State deviates from the agreed the ESM can terminate the 
credit line. Then, this State may request regular support under a complete macro-
economic adjustment program. Consequently, this will be connected with even 
harsher conditions such as permanent and external supervision of the state 
budget.  
 
4. The a lack of realistic substance in "no" and "yes"  
 
  
Based on the above, people who voted for "yes" in the referendum essentially 
accept a milder memorandum, while those who answered "no" rejected the 
presented memorandum as hard but they do not know that what is being offered 
at the moment by lenders is an even harder memorandum. 
 
The "no" vote reject any form of agreement as the other side is no longer 
available for mild agreements. In a sense, in both "no" and "yes" there is a lack of 
realistic substance because the actual proposal that currently is on the table is 
subject to the hard rules of the ESM. Therefore, the referendum involved a more 
normative question which could be summed up in the dipole “remain in the 
Eurozone with specific hard sacrifices (yes) or remain in the Eurozone only under 
a moderate agreement (no)”. 
 
Referendums comprise a democratic legacy when they are not serving 
considerations, when they do not ask misleading questions and when the 
questions are not connected with fiscal issues. Referendum is a democratic legacy 
only when is carried out under conditions of mature debate but not in conditions 
of division. It is a democratic legacy when it is carried out in conditions of open 
banks and not under the abomination of panic and fear. But the most important 
aspect is the objective of the referendum. The government claimed that the "no" 
vote will bring a softer deal. But as the collapse of the Greek economy is 
exacerbated, lenders’ proposals will become even harder than the previous ones. 
Therefore, the real objective of the referendum was canceled. 
 
Apart from all the above, there is also a crucial problem connected with the result. 
With abstention close to 40%, with 6% invalid ballots and 40% “yes” votes, it is 
difficult to admit that it consists a real triumph for the government. Almost two 
thirds of the total electorate did not declare their acceptance for the 
government’s option. In conclusion, the referendum was a political mistake at a 
wrong time. You cannot conduct referendums with the gun on the temple. This is 
a hypocritical democracy serving government’s sake. Democracy includes terms 
and conditions and is not neither a festival nor an intraparty process. 
 
Given that the hardest scenario is a formal bankruptcy of the country that will 
lead to the drachma, carrying an uncontemplated debt and with a divided society, 
it is time all political forces to deepen on the substantive data and address unity 
and truth to the people. In conclusion, no political party can lift alone the 
forthcoming difficulties. The real dilemma for which the conduction of a 
referendum should be reconsidered is "unity or division?". Still there is time to 
bridge the gaps. 
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